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We consider job scheduling settings, with multiple machines, where jobs arrive online and choose a machine
selfishly so as to minimize their cost. Our objective is the classic makespan minimization objective, which
corresponds to the completion time of the last job to complete. The incentives of the selfish jobs may lead
to poor performance. To reconcile the differing objectives, we introduce posted machine prices. The selfish
job seeks to minimize the sum of its completion time on the machine and the posted price for the machine.
Prices may be static (i.e., set once and for all before any arrival) or dynamic (i.e., change over time), but they
are determined only by the past, assuming nothing about upcoming events. Obviously, such schemes are
inherently truthful.
We consider the competitive ratio: the ratio between the makespan achievable by the pricing scheme and
that of the optimal algorithm.We give tight bounds on the competitive ratio for both dynamic and static pricing
schemes for identical, restricted, related, and unrelated machine settings. Our main result is a dynamic pricing
scheme for related machines that gives a constant competitive ratio, essentially matching the competitive
ratio of online algorithms for this setting. In contrast, dynamic pricing gives poor performance for unrelated
machines. This lower bound also exhibits a gap between what can be achieved by pricing versus what can be
achieved by online algorithms.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online algorithms can be viewed as follows: events arrive over time, and upon the arrival of an
event, the algorithm makes a decision, based only on the prior and current event, without knowing
future events. There is a function that maps outcomes to costs or benefits, where the goal of such
an algorithm is either to minimize costs or to maximize benefits. The competitive ratio of an online
algorithm seeks to compare the outcome of the online algorithm with the optimal outcome. The
term competitive analysis was coined in [27] and gives the ratio between the outcome (cost or
benefit) achieved by an online algorithm and the outcome of an offline optimal solution. Herein we
only deal with cost problems so this ratio is ≥ 1.
We consider a setting where every online event is associated with a selfish agent. The agents
have some associated true type that describes the nature of the event. Agents have some utility (or
disutility) associated with the outcome. For many online algorithms, the decisions made by the
algorithmmight not be in the best interest of the agent. This may result in the agent misrepresenting
her type so as to achieve a better outcome for herself.
The design of mechanisms mitigates the problem of strategic behavior described above. In
a mechanism, agents report their type, and the mechanism decides upon an outcome and upon
payments, where payments are used to align the incentives of the agents with that of the mechanism.
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A mechanism is truthful if it is always in the best interest of any agent to report her type truthfully.
In online settings, agents arrive sequentially, and the mechanism decides upon an outcome and
payment for each arriving agent as they arrive1.
With few notable exceptions (e.g., [32]), problems studied in mechanism design (both online
and offline settings) involve maximizing social welfare or revenue. Although optimal solutions to
maximization/minimization objectives can be cast as the other, the competitive ratio is quite different
in the two settings. Online algorithms have been devised with both maximization and minimization
objectives. The technique of “classify and randomly select” [6] often gives simple randomized
algorithms for maximization objectives which also naturally translate into truthful mechanisms. In
contrast, minimization objectives (e.g., k-server and makespan) require entirely different techniques.
Converting online algorithms into mechanisms without performance degradation opens up an
entire new class of problems for which incentive compatible mechanism design is applicable.
Dynamic posted prices.We consider truthful online mechanisms that take the form of dynamic
posted prices. Dynamic pricing schemes are truthful online mechanisms that post prices for every
possible outcome, before the next agent arrives. Then, the agent chooses the preferred outcome —
minimizing the cost for the outcome minus the price tag associated with the outcome.
Such a mechanism is inherently truthful, since prices are determined irrespective of the type of
the next agent. Posted price mechanisms have many additional advantages over arbitrary truthful
online mechanisms. In particular such mechanisms are simple [23]: agents need not trust nor
understand the logic underlying the truthful mechanism, agents are not required to reveal their
type, and there is no need to verify that the agents indeed follow the decision made by the truthful
online mechanism.2
A posted price mechanism is a truthful online algorithm, and as such, can perform no better
than the best online algorithm. Our main goal in this paper is to study the performance of dynamic
posted price mechanisms (quantified by the competitive ratio measure) and compare them with the
performance of the best online algorithm. One may think of this problem as analogous to one of the
central questions in algorithmic mechanism design in offline settings: compare the performance of
the best truthful mechanism (quantified by the approximation ratio measure) with the performance
of the best non-truthful algorithm.
Makespan minimization in job scheduling. In this paper we study the design of online
mechanisms for makespan minimization in job scheduling. Events represent jobs, the job type
contains the job’s processing times on various machines. Agents seek to complete their job as soon
as possible, and therefore prefer to be assigned to a machine whose load (including the new job) is
minimized3. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that all jobs arrive (sequentially) at time zero.
However, our positive results hold even if jobs arrive at arbitrary times. Clearly, adding options
(arbitrary arrival times) does not invalidate impossibility results. Existing online algorithms for the
1Such online mechanisms are called prompt in that outcomes and payments are determined immediately, non-prompt online
mechanisms have also been studied where, for example, the payment is only determined later.
2One may suspect that any online mechanism gives rise to dynamic pricing schemes. This is not quite true: the online
mechanism must be prompt, and, moreover, the online mechanism may require that ties (equal utility choices) be broken in
a particular manner, and as a function of the agent type. In contrast, with dynamic pricing schemes agents may break ties
arbitrarily. Many thanks to Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, and Noam Nisan for discussions
clarifying this point. Clearly, any dynamic pricing scheme gives rise to a prompt online truthful mechanism with the same
performance guarantees.
3In this interpretation “load” is the time required by the server to deal with all current jobs in the server queue, and jobs
are processed in a first-in-first-out manner, i.e., jobs enter a server queue. In some papers “load” is used in the context of
round-robin processing.
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problem (e.g., [3]) are not truthful; in that a job may misrepresent its size so as to get a preferential
assignment to a machine.
An online truthful mechanism for this setting determines an allocation and payment for each
arriving agent upon arrival. That is, upon the arrival of a job, based on the job’s processing times,
the mechanism assigns the job to some machine and determines the payment the agent should
make. The cost of an agent is the sum of the machine’s load (including her own processing time)
and the payment. Each agent seeks to minimize her cost.
A dynamic posted price mechanism for this setting sets prices on each machine, before the next
agent arrives (prices may change over time). The next agent to arrive seeks to minimize her cost,
i.e., the load on the chosen machine (including her own load) plus the posted price on the machine.
The agent breaks ties arbitrarily.
We consider this question for the goal of makespan minimization in job scheduling, where the
dynamic pricing scheme seeks to minimize the makespan, whereas selfish jobs seek to minimize
their own completion time. We assume FIFO processing within a machine, so the completion time
of a job is the sum of the current load (prior to the arrival of the job) plus the job’s own processing
time on the machine. This problem has many applications, including managing queues at banks,
cloud computing settings where customers submit jobs and can lie about their processing times,
and crowdsourcing settings where taskmasters wish to hire workers to complete tasks while lying
about how long their task takes to complete. In all such applications, we are interested in balancing
loads appropriately. To this end, we consider online makespan minimization for identical, restricted,
related, and unrelated machine models.
Examples. To clarify the issue of selfish jobs, consider the following small toy problem: the
setting is that of machines with speeds, machine #1 has speed 1, machine #2 has speed 1/2. There
are also two jobs, job a is of size 1/2 and job b is of size 1. Clearly, the minimal makespan is achieved
by assigning job a to machine #2 and job b to machine #1. This gives a makespan of one. Assume
that the order of arrival is a, b. Job a will prefer machine #1 (completion time 1/2) to machine
#2 (completion time 1). Job b will also prefer machine #1 (completion time 1.5) to machine #2
(completion time 2).
In this specific case a static pricing of 1/2 + ϵ for machine #1 and a price of zero for machine #2
will result in the optimal makespan irrespective of the order of arrival of the jobs. If the order is a,
b then job a prefers machine #2 (completion time 1 + price 0 = 1) over machine #1 (completion
time 1/2 + price 1/2 + ϵ = 1 + ϵ). The second job to arrive, job b, prefers machine #1 (completion
time 1 + price 1/2 + ϵ = 1.5 + ϵ) over machine #2 (completion time 3 + price 0 = 3). One can verify
that the order b,a will also achieve the same minimal makespan result.
The above example is somewhat misleading as we do not want to derive prices for a specific
set of arriving jobs but for any arbitrary set and arbitrary order. In fact, we show that, in general,
static prices are no better than a complete lack of prices (see Section 4), and only dynamic prices
can guarantee a constant competitive ratio. A more detailed example that also illustrates the use of
our dynamic pricing scheme for related machines (see Section 2) appears in Appendix B.
1.1 Our Model
We havem machines and n jobs which arrive in an online manner. Unrelated, related, restricted,
and identical machine models are defined as follows:
(1) For unrelated machines, the processing time of job j on machine i is given by pi j .
(2) In the related machines model, each machine i has some speed si and each job j has some
associated size pj . The processing time of job j on machine i is given by pi j =
pj
si
.
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(3) In the restricted machines model, each job j has some associated size pj . The processing
time of job j on machine i is either pj or∞.
(4) In the identical machines model, each job j has some associated size pj , which is job j’s
processing time on all machines.
In the online setting, neither processing times, pi j , nor size, pj , are known until job j arrives.
Machine speeds si are known in advance. While jobs do arrive in adversarial order, by renaming
we can assume that job j is the jth job to arrive.
We denote by σ an input sequence consisting of jobs 1 through n. For a machine i , we letMi (j)
denote the set of jobs that have been assigned to machine i after jobs 1 through j have arrived. We
denote the load on machine i after jobs 1 through j have arrived by ℓi (j) = ∑b ∈Mi (j) pib . For the
makespan objective, the goal is to minimize maxi ℓi (n). Given an input sequence σ , we denote by
L∗(σ ) an optimal solution that is omniscient and knows the entire input sequence σ in advance
(i.e., an optimal solution that knows all jobs’ processing times). When clear from the context, we
omit the parameter σ and simply write L∗.
A dynamic pricing scheme D, given an input sequence σ , outputs a sequence of n vectors
π1, . . . ,πn ∈ Rm , where each πj =
(
π1j , . . . ,πmj
)
represents a vector of prices for each of the
m machines. Each vector πj is determined before the jth job arrives. We view jobs as rational selfish
agents who must choose the machine to which they wish to be assigned. In particular, we model
each arriving agent j’s cost on machine i as ci j = ℓi (j − 1) + pi j + πi j , where ℓi (j − 1) is the load on
machine i before j arrives, pi j is the processing time of job j on machine i , and πi j is the price on
machine i (determined before j arrives). Hence, agent j’s cost on machine i represents how long
agent j must wait in order to be processed by machine i , given the load of the machine upon j’s
arrival, plus some price amount determined by the dynamic pricing scheme. We assume that agents
are rational and wish to minimize their cost. That is, agent j chooses a machine that attains the
minimum value mini ci j .
Note that, in our model, each player is a job, not a machine. Hence, a job (i.e., player) may
potentially misreport its processing times to the scheme in order to lower its incurred cost. However,
dynamic pricing schemes are inherently truthful (since the prices are set independently of reported
processing times), and hence jobs never benefit from lying regarding their processing times on
machines. We denote by D(σ ) the makespan of the schedule produced by the dynamic pricing
scheme D given input σ , D(σ ) = maxi ℓi (n) — the maximum load of any machine.
We can similarly define a static pricing scheme, which simply sets onem-dimensional vector of
prices π (i.e., a single value for each machine) before any agents arrive. We do not permit static
pricing schemes to change prices over time (so that πi1 = πi j for all i and j ≥ 1). For this reason,
when referring to static pricing schemes, we simply use one subscript instead of two. In particular,
we write πi∗ to denote the price on machine i (at all times), so that π = (π1∗, . . . ,πm∗).
We say that a dynamic pricing scheme is c-competitive if, given any input sequence σ , the scheme
always produces a schedule with a makespan satisfying D(σ ) ≤ c · L∗(σ ) + a (assuming that agents
behave selfishly), where we allow some additive constant a.
1.2 Our Contributions
We give tight results for the competitive ratios that can be achieved via dynamic and static pricing
schemes for the problem of minimizing makespan. We study identical, related, restricted, and
unrelated machine models. Our results, in comparison with previous work, are summarized in
Table 1. Our main results are as follows (m denotes the number of machines).
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Table 1. Competitive ratio comparison of the greedy algorithm, the best online algorithm, static pricing
schemes, and dynamic pricing schemes. Here, the greedy algorithm denotes the algorithm that assigns each
job to the machine that minimizes the current load plus processing time of the job on the machine. Results in
the Static Pricing and Dynamic Pricing columns are from this paper.
Machine Model Greedy Best Online Static Pricing Dynamic Pricing
Identical O(1) [22] O(1) [22] O(1) O(1)
Related Θ(logm) [3] O(1) [3] Θ(logm) O(1)
Restricted Θ(logm) [9] Θ(logm) [9] Θ(logm) Θ(logm)
Unrelated Θ(m) [3] Θ(logm) [3, 9] Θ(m) Θ(m)
(1) A dynamic pricing scheme that achieves anO(1) competitive ratio for the related machines
model. This matches the O(1)-competitive result (of a non-truthful online algorithm) given
in [3].
(2) A lower bound on the competitive ratio of any dynamic pricing scheme of Ω(m) for
unrelated machines. Our lower bound holds for any randomized dynamic pricing scheme,
even assuming an oblivious adversary.
To the best of our knowledge, the lower bound for unrelated machines exhibits the first gap
between what can be achieved by dynamic pricing schemes versus what can be achieved by online
algorithms. That is, a gap of Ω(m) (for randomized dynamic pricing) versus O(logm) (achieved via
deterministic online algorithms [3]).
OurO(1)-competitive dynamic pricing scheme for related machines also holds in a more general
model where jobs arrive in real time (as opposed to arriving in sequence). In such a setting, jobs
are processed over time on machines and are eventually removed from machines completely (upon
being fully processed). The objective is to minimize the completion time of the last job to complete.
In addition, we show that static pricing schemes and the online greedy algorithm4 achieve the
same performance up to a constant factor. Clearly, the static pricing scheme that sets all prices to
zero mimics the greedy algorithm. Furthermore, we show that any lower bound on the competitive
ratio of the greedy algorithm translates to the same lower bound on any static pricing scheme5
(up to constant factors), for all machine models considered in this paper. We note that such a
greedy algorithm is O(1)-competitive for identical machines [22], Θ(logm)-competitive for related
machines [3], Θ(logm)-competitive for the restricted assignment model [9], and Θ(m)-competitive
for unrelated machines [3]. These results appear in the columns labeled Greedy and Static Pricing
in Table 1.
1.3 Techniques
Positive Results for Related Machines. Our O(1)-competitive dynamic pricing scheme for the
related machines model is inspired by the corresponding related machines algorithm given in [3],
referred to as Slow-Fit in [8].
We now describe the main ideas behind our main result by discussing Slow-Fit. We assume
that machines are sorted in increasing order of their speed, so that s1 ≤ · · · ≤ sm . In particular,
Slow-Fit operates in phases, where each phase maintains a lower bound Λ on the current optimal
4We refer to the online greedy algorithm as the greedy algorithm that assigns each job to a machine that minimizes the
current load plus processing time of the job on the machine.
5This result holds for any deterministic pricing scheme. For randomized schemes, it holds as long as the lower bound for
the greedy algorithm does not depend on the tie-breaking rule.
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solution. The estimate Λ doubles from phase to phase. A job j is said to be feasible on machine
i if ℓi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ 2Λ. Slow-Fit assigns the job to the lowest index (slowest) machine on which
it is feasible. If no machine is feasible, Slow-Fit doubles Λ. This doubling process repeats until Λ
exceeds the value of the optimal solution (i.e., Λ becomes an upper bound), after which, for any
incoming job, some machine is feasible (and hence such jobs can be assigned). Clearly, Slow-Fit
depends on the incoming job’s size. The challenge in emulating Slow-Fit via a dynamic pricing
scheme is that prices must be set before the size of the next job is revealed.
To show the underlying ideas, we now make several assumptions for which we show how to set
prices for two machines that perfectly emulate Slow-Fit. The assumptions are (a) Both machines
have different speeds, (b) Selfish jobs break ties in favor of machine 1, and (c) Λ is a known upper
bound on the optimal solution.
Without loss of generality the price on machine 1 is zero. Slow-Fit assigns job j to machine 1 if
and only if job j is feasible on machine 1, hence, we would like to set a price on machine 2, π2j , so
that
ℓ1(j − 1) +
pj
s1
≤ ℓ2(j − 1) +
pj
s2
+ π2j ⇐⇒ ℓ1(j − 1) +
pj
s1
≤ 2Λ.
This is achieved by setting
π2j = ℓ1(j − 1) − ℓ2(j − 1) + s1
(
1
s1
− 1
s2
)
(2Λ − ℓ1(j − 1)) .
As the price π2j is independent of pj this gives a valid dynamic pricing scheme. Substitution and
rearrangement show that a job is assigned to machine 1 if and only if it is feasible on machine 1, as
required. Note that this does not hold for equal speed machines, and if tie-breaking is not in favor
of machine 1.
It follows from the simple example above, that the following issues must be considered so as to
construct a dynamic pricing scheme that attempts to emulate Slow-Fit, these are:
• Equal Speed Machines: Imagine that machines i and i + 1 have the same speed, and job j is
feasible on both, then job j should be scheduled on machine i . However, it may be that a
larger job j is infeasible on i but still feasible on i + 1, in this case it should be assigned to
i + 1. However, if the machines have the same speed, then irrespective of any prices and job
size, the same machine will always be chosen (as the difference in costs between machines
i and i + 1 is constant).
• New Phase Recognition: A new phase starts when the job has no feasible machine. However,
the pricing scheme cannot tell that a new phase is about to begin because it does not know
the size of the next job to arrive.
• Machine Tie-Breaking: Beyond the issue of feasibility (which is also a problem, see above),
as the job size increases, different machines (of different speeds) will attain the minimal
cost, irrespective of the prices and the current loads. Ergo, a job cannot be assumed to
choose the lowest index machine.
If none of these issues were to arise, then it would be possible to come up with a dynamic pricing
scheme that would precisely mimic the decisions made by Slow-Fit (as in the two machine example
above). To deal with these issues, we design a new online algorithm, Flex-Fit, a variant of Slow-Fit
(see Algorithm 1). Flex-Fit allows more flexibility in assigning jobs to multiple machines, and in
deciding when to start a new phase. This new algorithm does lend itself to dynamic pricing schemes
with the same competitive ratio, up to a constant factor.
The dynamic pricing scheme that emulates Flex-Fit is described in Algorithm 3. We carefully
choose a subset of machines that have strictly increasing speeds on which to place finite prices.
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Other machines get a price of infinity. The prices are set such that the job prefers lower indexed
machines to higher indexed machines if and only if the job is feasible on the lower indexed machine.
Impossibility Results for Unrelated Machines. We next describe techniques used in our
Ω(m) lower bound on the competitive ratio of dynamic pricing for unrelated machines. As a warm
up, we give a deterministic lower bound. The lower bound job sequence consists of two types of
jobs, depending on two cases regarding the behavior of the deterministic dynamic pricing scheme.
In case 1, we introduce a type 1 job that results in an increase in the sum of machines’ loads, for the
dynamic pricing scheme. In contrast, any type 1 job is assigned in an optimal solution without an
increase in any machine load. In case 2, we introduce a type 2 job, which always chooses machine
1 (under the dynamic pricing scheme). On the other hand, an optimal solution can always spread
out any sequence ofm type 2 jobs. This input sequence shows a gap of Ω(m) for the competitive
ratio of deterministic dynamic pricing schemes.
Our randomized lower bound holds against oblivious adversaries (i.e., adversaries that must
construct the entire input sequence in advance, before seeing any coin flips of the algorithm). To
achieve our randomized lower bound, we use the same two types of jobs as in the deterministic
case. We show how to construct such a sequence obliviously, depending on the relative probability
of being in case 1 or in case 2.
Static Pricing ≡ Greedy. The non trivial direction is to show that every static pricing scheme
can be as bad as the greedy algorithm. To do so, we observe that static pricing schemes can be
viewed as starting the online process with some initial (arbitrary) imbalance in the loads. For
deterministic static pricing schemes we show how to flatten out the effective loads (= load + price)
so that they are all equal. Once this is done, we can then apply the greedy lower bound sequence,
obtaining a similar lower bound result for any static pricing scheme.
For randomized schemes, we give a different construction, that holds as long as the lower bound
for the greedy algorithm does not depend on the tie-breaking rule. The idea is to blow up the job
sizes in the greedy lower bound sequence so that the initial imbalance in the effective load becomes
negligible.
1.4 Related Work
Online Algorithms. Introduced in the context of self-adjusting search trees [34], paging, list
update [33], and snoopy caching [26], there soon arose a vast host of online problems for which
competitive analysis was applied. These include problems such as metrical task systems [11], the
k-server problem [29, 30], scheduling problems, routing problems, and many more. One particular
class of problems that has been widely studied is that of online makespan minimization [3, 7, 9, 31].
Online Makespan Minimization. The literature on online makespan minimization is vast, we only
discuss the most relevant works. Online load balancing results for a variety of machine models
appear in [3]. An O(logm)-competitive algorithm for unrelated machines and an 8-competitive
algorithm for related machines were given (i.e., the Slow-Fit algorithm). It was also shown that
greedy is Θ(m)-competitive for unrelated machines and Θ(logm)-competitive for related machines.
The greedy algorithm was shown to be Θ(logm)-competitive for the restricted assignment model
(moreover, no online algorithm can do better) [9]. Results for the identical machines model appear
in [10] and [2], where a (2 − ϵ)-competitive online algorithm for a small fixed ϵ > 0 and a 1.923-
competitive algorithm were given, respectively.
Many other makespan minimization problems have been studied in the online setting, including
different objectives such asminimizing the Lp norm forp ≥ 1 [4] (the classic makespanminimization
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problem corresponds to minimizing the L∞ norm), settings where machines have activation costs [7,
31], and load balancing in the multidimensional setting [24, 31].
Static and Dynamic Pricing Schemes for Online Settings. Dynamic pricing schemes for a variety
of problems appear in [16]. In particular, [16] gave an O(k)-competitive algorithm for the k-server
problem on a line, an O(m)-competitive algorithm for metrical task systems (wherem denotes
the number of states), and a competitive ratio that is logarithmic in the ratio of the maximum to
minimum distances between points for metrical matching on a line. Additional static and dynamic
pricing schemes appear in [21], where queue management problems were studied, and constant
competitive ratios were obtained for social welfare. Dynamic pricing schemes were also considered
in [28], in which the revenue maximization problem where a seller has an unlimited supply of
identical goods was studied. A dynamic pricing scheme for routing small jobs (relative to the edge
capacities) through a network was considered in [5].
Posted Prices for Social Welfare and Revenue. Posted pricing schemes [12, 13, 20] need not be
online, may use non-anonymous pricing, and often assume something is known about the future
(e.g., public valuations, Bayesian settings, etc.). There is a large body of works on posted price mech-
anisms for social welfare and revenue maximization. In the full information setting (only the order
of arrival is unknown), a static posted pricing scheme was given that obtains the optimal welfare for
unit-demand buyers, and at least half of the optimal welfare for any valuation function [17]. This
uses ideas from [19]. The Bayesian setting was considered in [20], where agents’ valuations are
drawn from a product distribution over XOS valuations. A static posted pricing scheme was given
that achieves at least half the optimal welfare (in expectation). A general framework for the design
of posted price mechanisms for welfare maximization in Bayesian settings was devised in [18].
Pricing schemes for revenue maximization in Bayesian settings were considered in [12–14]. In
these settings agents arrive sequentially and are offered (non-anonymous) prices. It was shown that
the optimal revenue can be approximated to within a constant factor in various single-parameter
and multi-parameter settings.
Coordination Mechanisms for Job Scheduling. There is also a research agenda within the price of
anarchy literature that studies the notion of coordination mechanisms. This body of work focuses
on non-truthful mechanisms in the offline setting, where jobs are selfish agents (note that jobs are
also selfish agents in our work). Here, performance is measured in terms of the price of anarchy. A
coordination mechanism for identical machines appears in [15], where it was shown that the price
of anarchy is 43 − 13m . Various local policies for a variety of machine models appear in [25]. It was
shown that any deterministic coordination mechanism has a price of anarchy of O(logm) for the
related and restricted models, and an Ω(logm) lower bound was given for the price of anarchy for
the restricted model. For unrelated machines, a Θ(m) bound was given for a simple randomized
policy. The weighted sum of completion times objective has also been studied [1].
2 PRICING RELATED MACHINES
We begin by giving an online algorithm for the load balancing problem on related machines with a
constant competitive ratio. Our online algorithm is inspired by the Slow-Fit algorithm [3]. We do
this to aid us in designing a dynamic pricing scheme that can mimic the behavior of the online
algorithm. This ensures that our dynamic pricing scheme will have the same competitive ratio as
the online algorithm.
We first assume that machines are sorted in increasing order of speed, so that s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sm
(i.e., the first machine is the slowest machine, and themth machine is the fastest machine). Our
algorithm and dynamic pricing scheme proceed in phases, where each phase depends on our current
estimate Λ of the optimal makespan L∗. A new phase begins upon realizing that the current estimate
is too small, at which point we update the estimate accordingly. We use the notion of virtual loads
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in our algorithms, which we denote by ℓˆi (j). Virtual loads capture the real load within a particular
phase, and are reset to zero once a new phase begins. The real load on a machine is essentially
given by the sum of virtual loads over all phases. All loads and virtual loads begin at zero.
Our algorithms use the notion of representative machines, which are determined by the current
virtual loads ℓˆi (j).
Definition 2.1 (Representative). Fix any machine i and job j. Let R = {k : sk = si } be the set of
machines with the same speed as i . We say the representative of machine i when job j arrives is an
arbitrary machine k ∈ R that minimizes ℓˆk (j − 1). We denote the representative of machine i when
j arrives by ri (j).
Note that, for any machine i , if i is the only machine with a speed of si , then we have ri (j) = i
(for all j). Hence, the notion of a representative is mainly useful when there are multiple machines
with the same speed. In particular, the notion of representatives enables us to choose one machine
out of many that have the same speed (note that representatives may change over time as jobs
arrive). Moreover, we always have the property that sri (j) = si .
2.1 Flex-Fit: A Variant of Slow-Fit
ALGORITHM 1: Flex-Fit: A Variant of Slow-Fit
Assign job 1 to machine rm (j)
Λ← p1sm
ℓˆi (1) ← 0 for all i
while job j arrives do
T ← {i : ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ (2 + ϵ)Λ}
if T , ∅ then
S ← {i : ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ 2 · Λ}
if S = ∅ then
Optionally call New-Phase(j) and continue with the next job
end
k ← minimum machine index in S (set k ←m if S = ∅)
Assign j to an arbitrary machine r∗ ∈ {ri (j) : si ≤ sk and i ∈ T }
ℓˆr ∗ (j) ← ℓˆr ∗ (j − 1) + pjsi
ℓˆi′(j) ← ℓˆi′(j − 1) for all i ′ , r∗
end
else
New-Phase(j)
end
end
ALGORITHM 2: New-Phase
input : Job j
Assign j to any machine with a speed of sm
Λ← max{2, 2
⌈
log2
pj
smΛ
⌉
} · Λ
ℓˆi (j) ← 0 for all i
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For any fixed ϵ > 0, we give Algorithm Flex-Fit (which is inspired by the Slow-Fit algorithm
in [3]). The main theorem we show in this section is that Flex-Fit is O(1)-competitive for the
makespan minimization problem on related machines.
We give some intuition for the algorithm. Initially, we assign the first job to some fastest machine
and obtain a lower bound estimate of L∗, the optimal makespan. The algorithm considers two sets:
T = {i : ℓˆi (j − 1)+ pjsi ≤ (2+ ϵ)Λ} and S = {i : ℓˆi (j − 1)+
pj
si
≤ 2 ·Λ} (note that S ⊆ T ). In particular,
a job is feasible on machine i if and only if i ∈ S . The set T consists of machines that are slightly
infeasible for job j.
If T = ∅, then the algorithm simply begins a new phase. Starting a new phase corresponds to
assigning the job j to any machine of speed sm , along with updating Λ appropriately and resetting
virtual loads. If S , ∅, then the algorithm finds the lowest indexed machine in S , namely machine k .
In this case, it is free to assign j to the representative ri (j) of any machine i such that si ≤ sk
and i ∈ T . If S = ∅, then Flex-Fit is allowed to take one of two options: begin a new phase and
then wait to process the next job, or assign j to the representative ri (j) of any machine i such that
i ∈ T . We need this flexibility in order to mimic the online algorithm via a dynamic pricing scheme.
In particular, tie-breaking issues in our dynamic pricing scheme may arise, where a job can be
indifferent between choosing a machine of speed strictly less than sm (in which case a new phase
does not begin), or a machine of speed sm (in which case a new phase may possibly begin). Since we
do not have control over which machine agents choose, our online algorithm must be sufficiently
flexible and allow either of the two options to be taken.
Note that we assume job 1 has p1 > 0 (otherwise our initial estimate Λ = 0). If this is not the
case, we simply wait until such a job j arrives, and reindex jobs so that j = 1.
To show the theorem, we first prove two lemmata, Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.2 says that, as long as S , ∅ when a particular job j arrives, the load on the machine
to which j is assigned is within a constant of our estimate Λ. We defer the proof of Lemma 2.2 to
Appendix C.
Lemma 2.2. For any job j > 1, if S , ∅, Flex-Fit always assigns job j to a machine i such that
ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ (2 + ϵ)Λ.
Lemma 2.3 says that once our estimate Λ is at least the optimal makespan, then no more new
phases are initiated (the proof is similar to the proof that Slow-Fit is competitive [3], although it
must be adapted appropriately). We defer the proof of Lemma 2.3 to Appendix C.
Lemma 2.3. If Λ ≥ L∗, then S , ∅ for all jobs j > 1.
We now conclude the proof of the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 2.4. Flex-Fit isO(1)-competitive for the makespan minimization problem on related ma-
chines.
Proof. Observe that the final makespan of the online algorithm is at most (a) the sum of the
maximal loads over all phases, plus (b) any additional processing times incurred due to explicitly
assigning jobs to some fastest machine. That is, (b) refers to the very first job, along with all jobs
that cause a phase to end.
We let Λ1 = p1sm (i.e., the online algorithm’s first estimate once job 1 arrives), and in general
define Λh to be the value of Λ during phase h ≥ 1. Observe that the estimate Λh is always of the
form 2ah · Λ1 for some integer ah ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} (i.e., ΛhΛ1 is always a power of 2 for every phase
h). Moreover, we have Λh+1 ≥ 2 · Λh (since its new value is always its old value, multiplied by
max{2, 2 ⌈log2
pj
smΛh
⌉}, where j is the current job that caused a new phase to begin). Hence, ah < ah+1.
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Let k be the number of phases, where k ≥ 1. We first show that Λk ≤ 2 · L∗, where Λk denotes
the value of Λ during the final phase. If there is only one phase, we are done since the final
estimate is Λk = Λ1 = p1sm ≤ L∗ ≤ 2 · L∗. Now, suppose there are k ≥ 2 phases. Consider the(k − 1)st phase (i.e., the phase just before the last phase). The reason why the algorithm ended
phase k − 1 and started phase k is because the set S was empty when some job arrived. By
Lemma 2.3, it must have been the case that the estimate Λk−1 was strictly less than L∗. There
are two cases: Λk = 2 · Λk−1 or Λk = 2 ⌈log2
pj
smΛ
⌉ · Λk−1 (where j is the job that caused phase k
to begin). In the first case, we have Λk = 2 · Λk−1 < 2 · L∗. In the second case, we also have
Λk = 2
⌈log2
pj
smΛk−1 ⌉ · Λk−1 ≤ 2 · pjsmΛk−1 · Λk−1 ≤ 2 · L∗ (since
pj
sm
≤ L∗).
By Lemma 2.2, the total load that accumulates during a phase h (i.e., while T , ∅, or possibly
until S = ∅) is at most (2 + ϵ)Λh . In addition, the algorithm also assigns jobs to a machine
with the fastest speed (e.g., job 1, and all jobs that cause a new phase to begin). Such jobs j add
at most pjsm to the makespan. Note that the job j which causes some phase h to begin satisfies
pj
sm
≤ 2 ⌈log2
pj
smΛh−1 ⌉ · Λh−1 ≤ Λh (recall that p1sm = Λ1 by definition). Hence, each phase h incurs a
makespan of at most Λh + (2 + ϵ)Λh . Let ah ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} be the integer such that Λh = 2ah · Λ1.
In all, the final makespan is at most:
k∑
h=1
(3 + ϵ)Λh = (3 + ϵ)Λ1
k∑
h=1
2ah ≤ (3 + ϵ)Λ1 · 2ak+1 = 2 · (3 + ϵ) · 2akΛ1 ≤ 4 · (3 + ϵ) · L∗.
This concludes the proof of the theorem. □
2.2 Dynamic Pricing Scheme
We now give our dynamic pricing scheme, Dynamic-Related, which mimics the behavior of Flex-Fit.
That is, the dynamic prices set by Dynamic-Related (prior to the arrival of each job) have the
following property. Any incoming rational job j will choose some machine k such that Flex-Fit is
free to assign job j to machine k .
As before, assume that machines are sorted such that s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sm . We now give some
intuition behind the dynamic pricing algorithm and discuss some of its properties. Initially, the
algorithm sets prices so that the first job is incentivized to choose machinem (i.e., a machine with
the fastest speed), and then obtains an initial estimate Λ (in a manner similar to Flex-Fit). The
algorithm then enters an outer while loop which is responsible for setting prices before each next
job j arrives. It begins by sorting the values µi (j) = si (2 · Λ − ℓˆi (j − 1)) so that µi1 (j) ≤ · · · ≤ µim (j).
This is useful since a job is feasible on machine i ⇔ ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ 2 · Λ⇔ pj ≤ µi (j).
The inner while loop in Dynamic-Related is responsible for obtaining a carefully selected subse-
quence of machines with strictly increasing speeds. In particular, the inner while loop constructs a
set B with the property that for all 1 ≤ b ≤ |B |, we have st1 < st2 < · · · < st |B | (after renaming the
machine indices in B by t1 < t2 < · · · < t |B |). This property holds due to the process by which the
set B is created. Note that machine t1 has the same speed as the slowest machine (i.e., s1 = st1 ), since
the first machine added to set B is the machine in the rightmost position in the sorted ordering
µi1 (j) ≤ · · · ≤ µim (j) satisfying the property that it has the same speed as the slowest machine (i.e.,
machine 1’s speed). The inner while loop then removes all machines that appear earlier in the sorted
ordering than machine t1 from set A (including machine t1 itself). This implies that all machines
of speed st1 (i.e., the slowest machine speed) are removed from A, and hence the slowest machine
remaining in set A must have strictly larger speed. Therefore, when adding the second machine to
set B, namely machine t2, we get that the speed of t2 satisfies st2 > st1 . Repeating this process, we get
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ALGORITHM 3: Dynamic-Related: A Dynamic Pricing Scheme for Related Machines
πm1 ← 0, πi1 ←∞ for all i < m
After agent 1 chooses a machine q:
Λ← p1sq
ℓˆi (1) ← 0 for all i
while job j arrives do
µi (j) ← si (2 · Λ − ℓˆi (j − 1))
Sort the values µi (j) in ascending order so that µi1 (j) ≤ µi2 (j) ≤ · · · ≤ µim (j) (breaking ties arbitrarily)
A← [m], B = ∅
while A , ∅ do
s ← min{si : i ∈ A}
w ← max{a : sia = s}
B ← B ∪ {iw }
A← A \ {ia : a ≤ w}
end
Index the elements in B such that t1 < t2 < · · · < t |B | , where t1 is the smallest element, t2 is the second
smallest, etc.
πrt1 (j)j = 0
for b = 2 to |B | do
πrtb (j)j = ℓrtb−1 (j)(j − 1) − ℓrtb (j)(j − 1) +
(
1 − stb−1stb
)
((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb−1 (j − 1)) + πrtb−1 (j)j
end
if sm , st |B | then
πrm (j)j = ℓrt |B | (j)(j − 1) − ℓrm (j)(j − 1) +
(
1 − st |B |sm
)
((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆt |B |(j)(j − 1)) + πrt |B | (j)j
end
Set all other prices to∞
After agent j chooses a machine q:
if sq = sm and S = {i : ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ 2 · Λ} = ∅ then
Λ← max{2, 2
⌈
log2
pj
smΛ
⌉
} · Λ
ℓˆi (j) ← 0 for all i
end
else
ℓˆq (j) ← ℓˆq (j − 1) + pjsq
ℓˆi (j) ← ℓˆi (j − 1) for all i , q
end
end
that st1 < st2 < · · · < st |B | . In addition, we have the property that µt1 (j) ≤ · · · ≤ µt |B | (j), since each
time we add a machine to set B that appears later in the sorted order µi1 (j) ≤ µi2 (j) ≤ · · · ≤ µim (j).
The for loop is essentially responsible for determining which machines are given finite prices
(in addition to computing the actual prices). Note that the algorithm only sets finite prices on
representatives of machines, namely the representatives of machines t1, . . . , t |B | (possibly in addition
to the representative of machinem). Hence, jobs can only be assigned to the representatives of
machines t1, . . . , t |B | , and possibly the representative of machinem. Dynamic-Related then updates
Λ as necessary (in a manner similar to Flex-Fit).
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Our goal now is to prove that the prices determined by Dynamic-Related are such that for any
sequence of rational selfish jobs, the jobs will choose machines that are consistent with the choices
available to Flex-Fit. This is the same as saying that the competitive ratio of the Dynamic-Related
dynamic pricing scheme is the same as the competitive ratio of the Flex-Fit algorithm, which we
know is O(1) by Theorem 2.4. To summarize, we now seek to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.5. Dynamic-Related is anO(1)-competitive dynamic pricing scheme for the makespan
minimization problem on related machines.
We use FF and DR as shorthand when referring to Flex-Fit and Dynamic-Related, respectively.
The plan for the proof is to argue that the behavior of DR is consistent with the behavior of FF .
Note that, at certain points, FF is free to assign a job to one of multiple machines. Additionally, FF
may be free to start a new phase (or not). Hence, by the phrase “DR behaves consistently with FF ,”
we mean that DR sets prices so that any rational job to arrive will choose one of the permissible
actions that FF is free to take.
Throughout the proof, we make use of notation present in both algorithms. In addition, when
referring to the representative of a machine i when job j arrives, we write ri instead of ri (j)
and µi instead of µi (j) for ease of notation (we always refer to the current job j). Recall that
T = {i : ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ (2 + ϵ)Λ}, S = {i : ℓˆi (j − 1) +
pj
si
≤ 2 · Λ}, and k is the minimum machine
index in S (k =m if S = ∅).
Theorem 2.5 follows from the following four lemmas, the first of which explores some properties
of the prices DR assigns, while the remaining three argue that DR behaves consistently with FF in
three disjoint, exhaustive cases. The proofs of the following lemmas are deferred to Appendix C.
Lemma 2.6. If |B | ≥ 2, then for all 1 ≤ b ≤ |B | − 1, we have crtb (j)j ≤ crtb+1 (j)j if and only if tb ∈ T .
Similarly, if st |B | , sm , then crt |B | (j)j ≤ crm (j)j if and only if t |B | ∈ T .
We now argue that DR behaves consistently with FF for every fixed job j . Clearly, for j = 1, both
FF and DR behave in the same manner (including updating Λ). Now, consider any job j > 1. We
split the proof of up into three disjoint and exhaustive cases, classified as follows: set T is empty
(Lemma 2.7), set T is nonempty but set S is empty (Lemma 2.8), and finally set S is nonempty
(Lemma 2.9). Note that we always have S ⊆ T , so it is not possible for T to be empty while S is
nonempty.
Lemma 2.7. IfT = ∅, then DR assigns prices so that a rational job j chooses a machine of speed sm .
DR also updates Λ, and resets virtual loads to zero (precisely in the same manner as FF ).
Lemma 2.8. IfT , ∅ and S = ∅, thenDR processes job j in one of two ways.DR either (a) Sets prices
so that a rational job j chooses a machine of speed sm , updates Λ, and resets virtual loads to zero, or
(b) DR sets prices so that a rational job j chooses some representative ri where i ∈ T . Both options (a)
and (b) are consistent with FF .
Lemma 2.9. If S , ∅, then DR sets prices so that j chooses some representative ri where si ≤ sk and
i ∈ T (which is consistent with FF ).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.5.
3 LOWER BOUNDS FOR UNRELATED MACHINES
In this section, we first give a lower bound which shows that no deterministic dynamic pricing
scheme can achieve a competitive ratio better than Ω(m) for the unrelated machine setting. Note
that this competitive ratio can be achieved by the online greedy algorithm that assigns each job j
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to a machine that minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pi j . Moreover, this behavior can be mimicked by a dynamic
pricing scheme, simply by setting all prices πi j = 0.
Theorem 3.1. No deterministic dynamic pricing scheme can achieve a competitive ratio better than
Ω(m) for the unrelated machine setting.
Proof. Let D denote the dynamic pricing scheme, and let OPT denote an optimal solution (i.e.,
a solution that minimizes the makespan). Our lower bound consists of some number of phases
k , where k can be arbitrarily large. At the end of all k phases, we argue that the makespan of the
dynamic pricing scheme is at least k ·m, while OPT only has a makespan of at most (1 + 2ϵ) · k
for an arbitrarily small ϵ > 0. If we can maintain this property, this would imply a lower bound of
Ω(m) on the competitive ratio.
The input consists of the following sequence of jobs. Suppose the adversary has already intro-
duced j − 1 jobs, and the dynamic pricing scheme D has processed these jobs. Hence, the dynamic
pricing scheme must now set prices πi j on each machine i (before job j arrives). Then, we introduce
job j according to the following two cases (depending on how the dynamic pricing scheme D
behaves):
(1) If there exist two distinct machines i, i ′ such that ℓi (j − 1) + πi j + ϵ < ℓi′(j − 1) + πi′j ,
introduce the job j with pi j = ϵ , pi′j = 0, and pbj = ∞ for all b , i, i ′.
(2) Otherwise, introduce the job j with p1j = 1 and pi j = 1 + 2ϵ for all i > 1.
Note that, if in the second case all prices are∞, then we assume job j (i.e., agent j) breaks ties by
preferring machine 1. Each phase consists ofm occurrences of the second case.
The first claim we argue is that there exists an assignment of jobs to machines such that the
load on each machine grows by at most 1 + 2ϵ at the end of each phase. This implies that, after k
phases have concluded, there is an optimal solution with a makespan of at most (1 + 2ϵ) · k . We
construct such an assignment as follows. Observe that each time D assigns prices to machines
such that we fall into the first case, we simply assign the constructed job j to machine i ′ (i.e., the
machine satisfying pi′j = 0). Hence, each time case 1 occurs, the load of each machine remains the
same. On the other hand, consider the jobs introduced due to the second case during a phase, of
which there arem. We simply assign thesem jobs tom distinct machines. Each such job causes
the load on the machine to which it is assigned to increase by at most 1 + 2ϵ . Hence, there is an
assignment of jobs to machines that causes the load on every machine to increase by at most 1+ 2ϵ
after each phase completes.
We now argue that, after each phase completes, the dynamic pricing scheme D sets prices such
that jobs choose machines in a way that the load on the first machine increases bym. This implies
that, after k phases, the load on the first machine (according to the assignment given by D) is at
least k ·m, and hence the makespan must be at least k ·m. We first consider the case where D sets
prices such that we fall into case 1, and argue that the load for some machine increases by ϵ . In
this case, there exist two machines i and i ′ such that ℓi (j − 1) + πi j + ϵ < ℓi′(j − 1) + πi′j . We argue
that machine i attains the minimum cost ci j for job j. This holds since ci j = ℓi (j − 1) + pi j + πi j =
ℓi (j − 1) + ϵ + πi j < ℓi′(j − 1) + πi′j = ℓi′(j − 1) + pi′j + πi′j (recall that pi j = ϵ while pi′j = 0).
Moreover, cbj = ∞ for all b , i, i ′, since pbj = ∞. Hence, the dynamic pricing scheme D causes job
j to be assigned to machine i , which increases the load on machine i by ϵ .
We now consider the case where D sets prices such that we fall into case 2, and argue that each
such job always chooses machine 1 (causing the load on machine 1 to increase by 1, since p1j = 1 for
each such job j). Sincem such jobs are introduced during each phase, this would show that the load
onmachine 1 increases bym after each phase completes. In the second case, if π1j = ∞, then all prices
must be∞ (since there does not exist another machine i satisfying ℓi (j−1)+πi j+ϵ < ℓ1(j−1)+π1j =
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∞). Hence, since we assumed that such a job j breaks ties in favor of machine 1, the job j prefers
machine 1 over all other machines (which increases the load on machine 1 by 1). On the other hand,
if π1j is finite, we argue that job j is also assigned to machine 1. Observe that in the second case, for
any two machines i and i ′, we have ℓi (j−1)+πi j +ϵ ≥ ℓi′(j−1)+πi′j . Hence, for any machine i > 1,
we have c1j = ℓ1(j−1)+p1j+π1j = ℓ1(j−1)+1+π1j ≤ ℓi (j−1)+1+ϵ+πi j < ℓi (j−1)+1+2ϵ+πi j = ci j .
This implies that machine 1 minimizes job j’s cost, which in turn implies that the load on machine
1 increases by 1.
Finally, observe that we can always eventually force the dynamic pricing scheme D to produce
prices such that we fall into case 2. This holds since, each time we fall into case 1, there is an optimal
solution which satisfies the property that the load on every machine does not change. On the other
hand, D causes such jobs j to be assigned to some machine for which the processing time is ϵ . This
implies that the assignment determined by D causes the load on some machine to increase by ϵ ,
while in an optimal solution the load on every machine remains the same. This process cannot go
on forever, since the makespan of the schedule produced by D can be made arbitrarily bad while
the makespan of an optimal solution does not change (which would result in an arbitrarily bad
competitive ratio). □
We now give a lower bound of Ω(m) on the expected competitive ratio for any randomized
dynamic pricing scheme, which even holds against an oblivious adversary.
Theorem 3.2. No randomized dynamic pricing scheme can achieve an expected competitive ratio
better than Ω(m) for the unrelated machine setting.
Proof. Let D denote the randomized dynamic pricing scheme, and let OPT denote an optimal
solution (i.e., a solution that minimizes the makespan). Our lower bound draws on ideas from the
proof of our deterministic lower bound (i.e., the proof of Theorem 3.1). Let ϵ > 0 be arbitrarily
small. The input sequence will consist of some number of jobs n, where we make n arbitrarily large.
In particular, the input sequence is iteratively constructed by the adversary in a deterministic
manner. After the first j − 1 jobs have been determined (independent of the randomness of the
algorithm), the adversary constructs job j according to the following two cases, one of which must
happen with probability at least 12 (depending on the code of the dynamic pricing scheme D, but
independent of any random coin flips). Here, the probability is taken over the coin flips of the
algorithm, and the probability is computed as if the first j − 1 jobs constructed so far are given as
input to D (note that the jobs are only imagined to be given as input):
(1) There exist two distinct machines i, i ′ such that ℓi (j − 1) + πi j + ϵ < ℓi′(j − 1) + πi′j with
probability at least 12 . Note that, conditioned on this event occurring, there must exist a fixed
pair of machines (i, i ′) (obtained deterministically) such that the event ℓi (j − 1) + πi j + ϵ <
ℓi′(j − 1)+πi′j occurs with probability at least 1m2 , since there are at mostm2 such pairs. For
this fixed pair (i, i ′), the adversary constructs the job j with pi j = ϵ , pi′j = 0, and pbj = ∞
for all b , i, i ′.
(2) Otherwise, introduce the job j with p1j = 1 and pi j = 1 + 2ϵ for all i > 1.
Observe that one of these two cases must happen with probability at least 12 . Hence, the adversary
constructs job j depending on which such case occurs with higher probability. Note that, if in the
second case all prices are∞, then we assume job j (i.e., agent j) breaks ties by preferring machine 1.
Let n1 be the number of jobs constructed due to case 1, and n2 be the number of jobs constructed
due to case 2. Note that n1 and n2 are fixed (i.e., they are not random variables), and moreover we
have n1 + n2 = n. Using similar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, OPT ≤ (1 + 2ϵ) · ⌈n2m ⌉,
since we can always assign case 1 jobs to the machine on which a load of 0 is incurred. Moreover,
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for everym jobs constructed due to case 2, we can always put them jobs onm distinct machines,
increasing the makespan by at most (1 + 2ϵ).
On the other hand, we argue that the expected makespan of the dynamic pricing scheme D
must be large. Observe that for each job j constructed due to case 1, the dynamic pricing scheme’s
expected sum of loads increases as follows: E[∑i ℓi (j) − ℓi (j − 1)] ≥ ϵ · 12m2 . This holds since, for
each such job j , if the event ℓk (j−1)+πk j +ϵ < ℓk ′(j−1)+πk ′j occurs for the fixed pair of machines
(k,k ′), which happens with probability at least 12m2 , then job j induces a load of ϵ on machine k .
Hence, we have E[∑i ℓi (n)] ≥ n1 · ϵ · 12m2 . Moreover, for each job j constructed due to case 2, the
load on machine 1 increases by 1 with probability at least 12 (since if the event corresponding to
case 2 occurs, which happens with probability at least 12 , job j is assigned to machine 1). Hence, we
have E[ℓ1(n)] ≥ n2 · 12 . Putting it all together, we get
E
[
max
i
ℓi (n)
]
≥ E
[
max
{
1
m
∑
i
ℓi (n), ℓ1(n)
}]
≥ max
{ϵ · n1
2m3 ,
n2
2
}
.
We consider the following two cases. In the first case, we have n2 ≤ t ·m for some large integer
t , and in the other case we have n2 > t ·m. Note that we assume n2 > 0, as otherwiseOPT = 0 and
the competitive ratio is arbitrarily bad. In the first case, the expected competitive ratio is at least
ϵ ·(n−n2)
2m3 ·(1+2ϵ )· ⌈ n2m ⌉
≥ ϵ ·(n−t ·m)2m3 ·(1+2ϵ )·(t+1) = Ω(
√
n), which can be made arbitrarily bad (note that we choose
n sufficiently large so that
√
n ≫ t ·m3). In the second case, the expected competitive ratio is at
least n22(1+2ϵ )· ⌈ n2m ⌉
= Ω(m). Note that, in the second case, OPT is large and hence our lower bound
rules out additive constants in the competitive ratio of the dynamic pricing scheme.
□
4 GREEDY AND STATIC PRICING ARE EQUIVALENT
In this section, we relate the greedy algorithm and static pricing schemes. Our main theorem,
Theorem 4.1, is given below. The proof of Theorem 4.1 appears in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.1. If the greedy algorithm that assigns each job j to a machine i that minimizes ℓi (j −
1)+pi j is c-competitive in some machine model (either identical, related, restricted, or unrelated), then
the static pricing scheme that sets all prices to zero is also c-competitive. Moreover, a lower bound of
c on the (expected) competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm implies a lower bound of Ω(c) for any
deterministic or randomized static pricing scheme (for all machine models). The randomized lower
bound holds as long as the greedy lower bound does not specify how ties are broken.
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A STATIC PRICING SCHEMES ≡ GREEDY
Recall that a static pricing scheme is completely determined by an m-dimensional vector π =
(π1∗, . . . ,πm∗), which is set in advance before any agents arrive. First, we claim that static pricing
schemes can always mimic the online greedy algorithm where the greedy choice corresponds to
placing the incoming job j on the machine i that minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pi j . In particular, this online
greedy algorithm can be mimicked by a static pricing scheme, simply by setting all prices to 0 (i.e.,
π = (0, . . . , 0)). With these static prices, all incoming agents j choose a machine i that minimizes
ℓi (j − 1) + pi j + πi∗ = ℓi (j − 1) + pi j (since πi∗ = 0 for all i). Hence, agents choose a machine in a
manner that is consistent with the greedy algorithm’s choices.
Theorem 4.1 immediately follows from the discussion above, along with Lemma A.1 (our de-
terministic lower bound) and Lemma A.2 (our randomized lower bound) below. We first give our
deterministic lower bound in the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. A lower bound of c on the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm that assigns each
job j to a machine i that minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pi j implies a lower bound of Ω(c) on the competitive
ratio of any deterministic static pricing scheme (for the identical, related, restricted, and unrelated
machine models).
Proof. Assume we have some static pricing scheme, the prices of which are given by π =
(π1∗, . . . ,πm∗). We denote by πmax the largest price determined by the static pricing scheme, so
that πmax = maxi πi∗. For any input sequence σ , we denote by ALG(σ ) the makespan of the greedy
algorithm, and let ALG ′(σ ) denote the makespan achieved by the static pricing scheme. Suppose
there exists some adversarial sequence of n input jobs which gives witness to the lower bound
of c on the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm. That is, for any additive constant a, there
exists an input sequence σ which satisfies the property that ALG(σ ) > c · L∗(σ ) + a (recall that a
represents the additive constant in the competitive ratio, and L∗(σ ) denotes the makespan of an
optimal solution on input σ ). We note that L∗(σ ) can be made arbitrarily large by scaling all jobs
appropriately.
Our goal is to modify the input sequence σ by prepending a few jobs at the beginning of
the sequence, obtaining a new input sequence σ ′ which yields a comparable guarantee on the
competitive ratio for any static pricing scheme. In particular, our aim is to introducem input jobs
with the property that the loads plus prices on all machines are flattened out. More formally, we
introduce jobs 1, . . . ,m with the property that ℓi (m) + πi∗ = ℓi′(m) + πi′∗ = πmax for all machines
i, i ′. Once this is done, we can then introduce jobs in the sequence σ to the static pricing scheme,
and agents will choose machines in precisely the same manner as jobs are placed by the online
greedy algorithm. Note that, initially, all loads are 0 (i.e., ℓi (0) = 0 for all i).
We first describe the process in the unrelated machine setting. Here, for each machine i , we
introduce the job j such that pi j = πmax − πi∗ and pi′j = ∞ for all i ′ , i . These jobs may be
introduced in an arbitrary order (notice that there arem such jobs). At the end of this sequence of
m jobs, since each machine i gets exactly one of them jobs, we have ℓi (m) = πmax − πi∗, and hence
ℓi (m) + πi∗ = πmax for all machines i .
We now turn our attention to the identical machine setting. In this model, we must introduce
jobs in a specific order. In particular, we sort machines in increasing order of their prices, so that
we have πi1∗ ≤ πi2∗ ≤ · · · ≤ πim∗. We introduce the following jobs: for each j = 1, . . . ,m, we set
pj = πmax−πi j ∗. Notice that the first job choosesmachine i1, since ℓi1 (0)+p1+πi1∗ ≤ ℓi (0)+p1+πi∗ for
all machines i (if there are ties, then the agent can choose a machine arbitrarily and everything still
goes through). Moreover, we argue that every job 2 ≤ j ≤ m chooses machine i j . This holds since,
for allk < j , the cost onmachine ik is given by ℓik (j−1)+pj+πik ∗ = πmax−πik ∗+pj+πik ∗ = πmax+pj ,
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while the cost on machine i j is ℓi j (j − 1) + pj + πi j ∗ = (πmax − πi j ∗) + πi j ∗ = πmax. Moreover, for all
machines k ≥ j, the cost on machine ik is given by ℓik (j − 1) + pj + πik ∗ = pj + πik ∗ ≥ pj + πi j ∗,
which is the cost on machine i j . Hence, once allm jobs have been introduced, we have the property
that ℓi (m) + πi∗ = πmax for all machines i .
Finally, we describe the process by which we compute pj in the related machine setting for
each job 1 ≤ j ≤ m. In a continuous manner, starting from 0, we continuously increase pj until
the machine i that minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pjsi + πi∗ (note that the minimizing machine may change)
satisfies the property that ℓi (j − 1) + pjsi + πi∗ equals πmax (at which point the process stops). Once
equality is attained, we simply introduce the job j with this value of pj . Again, it is easy to see
that, after allm jobs have been introduced, we have the property that ℓi (m) + πi∗ = πmax for all
machines i .
As mentioned, to obtain a lower bound on the competitive ratio of ALG ′, we first introduce the
m jobs as mentioned above (i.e., flatten things out), followed by the input sequence σ (yielding the
sequence σ ′). Observe that ALG ′(σ ′) ≥ ALG(σ ), since the static pricing scheme incurs the same
load on every machine as the online greedy algorithm, in addition to the load of one of them jobs
introduced at the beginning of the entire sequence. By assumption, we have ALG(σ ) > c · L∗(σ )+ a.
Finally, we have L∗(σ ′) ≤ L∗(σ ) + πmax, since one feasible solution is to assign jobs to machines
precisely as an optimal solution on input σ does, along with placing them initial jobs onm distinct
machines (incurring an additional load of at most πmax). Putting everything together, we get
ALG ′(σ ′) ≥ ALG(σ ) > c · L∗(σ ) + a ≥ c · (L∗(σ ′) − πmax) + a. Since L∗(σ ′) ≥ L∗(σ ) can be made
arbitrarily large (in particular we can make L∗(σ ) ≫ πmax), we have ALG ′(σ ′) > Ω(c) · L∗(σ ′) + a,
giving the lemma. □
We now provide our randomized lower bound.
Lemma A.2. A lower bound of c on the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm that assigns
each job j to a machine i that minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pi j implies a lower bound of c on the expected
competitive ratio of any randomized static pricing scheme (for the identical, related, restricted, and
unrelated machine models). This implication holds as long as the greedy lower bound does not specify
how ties are broken.
Proof. Assume we have some randomized static pricing scheme, the prices of which are given
by π = (π1∗, . . . ,πm∗), where each πi∗ for 1 ≤ i ≤ m is a random variable. The idea behind the
proof is to scale each job’s processing times up by such a large amount that the randomly produced
prices on all machines become negligible. In particular, we scale jobs up by such a large amount
that even the largest price is negligible compared to the smallest (non-zero) processing time of any
job on any machine. We note that the following argument holds for all machine models, and in
particular for identical, related, restricted, and unrelated machines.
We scale jobs up as follows. Consider feeding the input sequence σ as input to the greedy
algorithm, and suppose that each time a job j is assigned to a machine, there are no ties to be
broken (i.e., ℓi (j − 1) + pi j , ℓk (j − 1) + pk j for all machines i , k). This is not true in general (in
particular, it is never true for the identical machines setting, as even the first job faces the same
load on all machines, namely zero), but we consider this case first for simplicity. Over the run
of the greedy algorithm on input σ , consider the smallest gap that ever exists between a pair of
machines. Namely, consider δ = minj mink,i |ℓi (j − 1)+pi j − ℓk (j − 1) −pk j | (note that δ , 0 by our
assumption). As long as we scale up jobs so that the random prices are≪ δ , then jobs are assigned
by the randomized static pricing scheme in precisely the same manner as they are by the greedy
algorithm. This holds since, if in the greedy algorithm machine i minimizes ℓi (j − 1)+pi j (note that
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this machine is unique by our assumption), then machine i also minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pi j + πi∗. In
particular, for all k , i we have ℓk (j − 1)+pk j +πk∗ ≥ ℓi (j − 1)+pi j +δ +πk∗ > ℓi (j − 1)+pi j +πi∗.
We now discuss the scenario when some jobs need to break ties among at least two machines
over the run of the greedy algorithm on input σ . In this case, we define δ to be the smallest non-zero
gap δ that ever exists over all possible runs of the greedy algorithm on input σ . By all possible
runs, we mean considering all possible ways that the greedy algorithm can resolve ties among
machines for each job. Similarly in this case, we scale all jobs so that each job’s processing times
are significantly larger relative to the prices. Now, for a job j, if all possible runs result in a unique
machine i that minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pi j , then the randomized static pricing scheme will assign it to
the same machine. On the other hand, if there exists a run that results in job j facing ties among
multiple machines, then the randomized static pricing scheme assigns j to one such machine (note
that, by the assumption in the statement of the lemma, job j is free to be assigned to any such
machine since the greedy lower bound does not specify how ties are broken). □
B AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We motivate why dynamic pricing is useful via a small example. We do so by comparing the
schedule produced without any pricing to the schedule produced via a dynamic pricing scheme.
For ease of presentation, we assume that our scheme knows the value of the optimal makespan,
which we denote by L∗. Schedules obtained without pricing are equivalent to schedules produced
by the greedy algorithm that assigns each job j to a machine i that minimizes ℓi (j − 1) + pjsi .
In our example (given as Figure 1) there arem = 3 machines, with speeds s1 = 12 , s2 =
1
2 (1 + ϵ),
and s3 = 1+2ϵ ; and n = 3 jobs, with sizes p1 = 12 (1+ϵ), p2 = 12 , and p3 = 1+2ϵ . The left, middle, and
right columns show the optimal assignment, the greedy assignment, and the assignment obtained
by our dynamic pricing scheme, respectively. In the middle and right columns, the arrival order is
from bottom to top.
Optimal makespan: The optimal makespan is L∗ = 1, achieved by assigning job 1 to machine
2, job 2 to machine 1, and job 3 to machine 3.
Greedy: The greedy algorithm assigns job 1 to machine 3, since the machine i that minimizes
p1
si
is the fastest machine (initially, all loads are 0). Job 2 is also assigned to machine 3, since
ℓ3(1) + p2s3 = 2+ϵ2(1+2ϵ ) < 11+ϵ =
p2
s2
<
p2
s1
(for sufficiently small ϵ > 0). Lastly, job 3 is also assigned to
machine 3, since ℓ3(2) + p3s3 =
2+ 5ϵ2
1+2ϵ <
2(1+2ϵ )
1+ϵ =
p3
s2
<
p3
s1
. Hence, the greedy algorithm assigns all
jobs to machine 3, resulting in a makespan of p1+p2+p3s3 ≈ 2.
Pricing scheme: Our dynamic pricing scheme sets prices before the arrival of each job, and
are independent of the type of the incoming job. The prices we use are the prices generated by
our O(1)-competitive dynamic pricing scheme. We defer the explanation of how to construct
these prices to Section 2. The following are the prices set prior to the arrival of job 1: π11 = 0,
π21 =
(
1 − s1s2
)
· (2 + ϵ2 ) L∗ = (2 + ϵ2 ) · ϵ1+ϵ > ϵ , and π31 = (1 − s2s3 ) · (2 + ϵ2 ) L∗+π21 ≈ 1+π21. Hence,
job 1 chooses machine 1, since c11 = p1s1 + π11 = 1 + ϵ < 1 + π21 =
p1
s2
+ π21 = c21 <
1
2 + 1 + π21 ≈
p1
s3
+ π31 = c31.
Prior to the arrival of job 2, the dynamic pricing scheme sets prices as follows: π12 = 0,π22 =
ℓ1(1) +
(
1 − s1s2
) ( (
2 + ϵ2
)
L∗ − ℓ1(1)
)
< 1 + ϵ + ϵ1+ϵ , and π32 =
(
1 − s2s3
) (
2 + ϵ2
)
L∗ + π22 ≈ 2. Hence,
job 2 chooses machine 2, since c22 = p2s2 + π22 <
2p2
1+ϵ + 1 + ϵ +
ϵ
1+ϵ = ℓ1(1) + p2s1 = c12 <
p2
1+2ϵ + 2 ≈
p2
s3
+ π32 = c32.
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Fig. 1. Example of the optimal makespan, the greedy algorithm, and dynamic pricing set using Algorithm 3.
Prices
π11 = 0 π21 > ϵ π31 ≈ 1 + π21
π12 = 0 π22 < 1 + ϵ + ϵ/(1 + ϵ) π32 ≈ 2
π13 = 0 π23 ≈ ϵ π33 ≈ 3/2
Finally, prior to the arrival of job 3, the dynamic pricing scheme sets the following prices: π13 = 0,
π23 = ℓ1(2)−ℓ2(2)+
(
1 − s1s2
) ( (
2 + ϵ2
)
L∗ − ℓ1(2)
) ≈ ϵ , andπ33 = ℓ2(2)+(1 − s2s3 ) ( (2 + ϵ2 ) L∗ − ℓ2(2))+
π23 ≈ 32 . Hence, job 3 choosesmachine 3, since c33 = p3s3 +π33 ≈ 52 , while c13 = ℓ1(2)+
p3
s1
= 1+ϵ+2p3 ≈
3 and c23 = ℓ2(2) + p3s2 + π23 = 11+ϵ +
2p3
1+ϵ + π23 ≈ 3.
Since machine 1 has the highest load, the schedule produced by our dynamic pricing scheme
achieves a makespan of ℓ1(3) = 1 + ϵ . This example can be extended to show that greedy can be as
bad as Ω(logm)-competitive, while in contrast our dynamic pricing scheme is O(1)-competitive.
C MISSING PROOFS FROM SECTION 2
Proof of Lemma 2.2:
Proof. Fix any arriving job j , and assume that S , ∅. Since S , ∅, we must also have thatT , ∅.
Hence, the algorithm assigns the job to any representative of a machine i when j arrives, where si ≤
21
sk and i ∈ T (recall thatk is the minimum index in S). Wewish to show that ℓˆri (j)(j−1)+ pjsi ≤ (2+ϵ)Λ.
Let i be anymachine inT , which implies that ℓˆi (j−1)+ pjsi ≤ (2+ϵ)Λ. The representative ri (j)must be
a machine satisfying ℓˆri (j)(j−1) ≤ ℓˆi (j−1). Hence, we have ℓˆri (j)(j−1)+ pjsi ≤ ℓˆi (j−1)+
pj
si
≤ (2+ϵ)Λ,
which gives the lemma. □
Proof of Lemma 2.3:
Proof. Suppose Λ ≥ L∗, and let j > 1 be any arriving job after our estimate Λ exceeds L∗. Note
that, once Λ ≥ L∗, virtual loads are reset to zero, and hence we only consider jobs that have arrived
since then. Assume towards a contradiction that S = ∅. Let f be the fastest machine satisfying
ℓˆf (j − 1) ≤ L∗, namely f = max{i : ℓˆi (j − 1) ≤ L∗}. If such a machine does not exist, we set f = 0
(in fact, we will show that such a machine must exist). For any machine i such that si = sm , we
must have ℓˆi (j − 1) > L∗, since otherwise we would have a contradiction to the fact that S = ∅:
ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi = ℓˆi (j − 1) +
pj
sm
≤ L∗ + L∗ ≤ 2 · Λ (note that pjsm ≤ L∗). In particular, we have sf < sm
(assuming f ≥ 1).
Now, let Γ = {i : si > sf }, and note that each machine in Γ has load strictly more than L∗ (if
f = 0, we let Γ be the set of all machines). By the fact that sf < sm , we know that Γ , ∅ (if f = 0,
this is also the case). Let Ji be the set of jobs assigned to machine i after the estimate Λ ≥ L∗, and
define J ∗i to be the set of jobs that the optimal solution assigns to i after Λ ≥ L∗. Then we have:∑
i ∈Γ
∑
j ∈Ji
pj
sm
=
1
sm
∑
i ∈Γ
si
∑
j ∈Ji
pj
si
>
1
sm
∑
i ∈Γ
si · L∗ ≥ 1
sm
∑
i ∈Γ
si
∑
j ∈J ∗i
pj
si
=
∑
i ∈Γ
∑
j ∈J ∗i
pj
sm
.
This implies that there must exist at least one job b ≤ j − 1 such that the online algorithm assigns b
to a machine i ′ ∈ Γ while the optimal solution assigns b to a machine i∗ < Γ. Hence, the set Γ is
neither empty nor the entire set of machines (note this shows that f ≥ 1, and hence there always
exists a machine i satisfying ℓˆi (j − 1) ≤ L∗).
Since b was assigned by the optimal solution to a machine i∗ < Γ, we have the property that
pb
si∗
≤ L∗. Moreover, since i∗ < Γ, we know that si∗ ≤ sf . Hence, we have pbsf ≤
pb
si∗
≤ L∗. In addition,
since ℓˆf (j − 1) ≤ L∗, we have ℓˆf (b − 1) + pbsf ≤ ℓˆf (j − 1) +
pb
sf
≤ 2 · L∗ ≤ 2 · Λ (since b ≤ j − 1 and
virtual loads can only grow within a phase). Thus, when job b arrived, the set S was nonempty
(and hence, T was also nonempty). This implies that the online algorithm assigned job b to the
representative i ′ = ri (b) of some machine i ∈ T where si ≤ sk (recall that k is the minimummachine
index in S). In particular, machine f ∈ S ⊆ T , and hence si ≤ sk ≤ sf . Since ri (b) ∈ Γ, we have
si ≤ sf < sri (b) = si , which yields a contradiction and gives the lemma. □
Proof of Lemma 2.6:
Proof. First, we suppose |B | ≥ 2. We claim that for all 1 ≤ b ≤ |B | − 1, we have crtb j ≤ crtb+1 j ⇔
ℓˆtb (j − 1) + pjstb ≤ (2 + ϵ)Λ. In particular, we have the following:
crtb j ≤ crtb+1 j ⇐⇒ ℓrtb (j − 1) +
pj
srtb
+ πrtb j ≤ ℓrtb+1 (j − 1) +
pj
srtb+1
+ πrtb+1 j
⇐⇒ pj
(
1
stb
− 1
stb+1
)
≤ ℓrtb+1 (j − 1) − ℓrtb (j − 1) + πrtb+1 j − πrtb j .
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Substituting for πrtb+1 j , we find that the right hand side of the expression is given by:
ℓrtb+1 (j − 1) − ℓrtb (j − 1)+[
ℓrtb (j − 1) − ℓrtb+1 (j − 1) +
(
1 − stb
stb+1
)
((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb (j − 1)) + πrtb j
]
− πrtb j
=
(
1 − stb
stb+1
)
((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb (j − 1)).
Hence, we have:
crtb j ≤ crtb+1 j ⇐⇒ pj
(
1
stb
− 1
stb+1
)
≤
(
1 − stb
stb+1
)
((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb (j − 1))
⇐⇒ pj ≤ stb ((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb (j − 1)) ⇐⇒ ℓˆtb (j − 1) +
pj
stb
≤ (2 + ϵ)Λ,
where we used the fact that stb < stb+1 when dividing both sides by ( 1stb −
1
stb+1
) (in the second
step). Thus, in the end we conclude that job j prefers machine rtb to machine rtb+1 if and only
if machine tb belongs to set T . Note that, due to tie-breaking issues, it is possible for a job j to
choose machine rtb+1 when pj = stb ((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb (j − 1)). We eventually argue that this does not
create any issues (note that if pj < stb ((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb (j − 1)), then job j strictly prefers machine
rtb to machine rtb+1 ). In addition, by the same reasoning, we can conclude that if st |B | , sm , then
crt |B | j ≤ crm j ⇔ t |B | ∈ T . □
Proof of Lemma 2.7:
Proof. We first consider the case when setT is empty. In this case, FF allows job j to be assigned
to any machine of the fastest speed (namely, speed sm), and begins a new phase by updating Λ
and sets all virtual loads to 0. Since set T is empty, we know that for all machines i , we have
ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi > (2 + ϵ)Λ. If st |B | , sm , then by Lemma 2.6, job j strictly prefers machine rm to the
representatives of all machines in B, namely crm j < crtb j for all 1 ≤ b ≤ |B | (note that these are the
only machines that receive finite prices, and hence are the only machines with a finite cost to the
job).
If st |B | = sm , then we have two cases depending on the size of B. If |B | = 1, then machine rm is
the only machine that receives a finite price. If |B | > 1, then since t |B |−1 < T , by Lemma 2.6 we
know that job j strictly prefers machine rt |B | (which has the same speed as machinem) to machine
rt |B |−1 (machine rt |B | is also strictly preferred to all machines rtb for 1 ≤ b ≤ |B | − 1). Thus, in all
cases, the machine rm is strictly preferred to all other machines. Hence, DR sets prices so that a
rational job j always chooses rm (FF is free to assign j to rm ). Moreover, after job j chooses rm , DR
checks if S = ∅ (which it is in this case, as T = ∅), and updates the estimate Λ along with all virtual
loads in the same manner as FF . □
Proof of Lemma 2.8:
Proof. Now we consider the case when set T is nonempty, but set S is empty. In this case, the
algorithm FF is allowed to assign job j in several ways. FF is free to assign job j to any machine of
the fastest speed and begin a new phase (i.e., update the estimate Λ and set all virtual loads to 0).
FF may also choose to forgo starting a new phase, in which case it is free to assign job j to any
machine ri where i ∈ T . Note that, in general, FF is free to assign job j to any machine ri where
i ∈ T and si ≤ sk , but in this case k =m (recall that k is the minimum machine index in S , but since
S = ∅, FF sets k =m). DR may or may not set prices so that job j chooses a machine of speed sm
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(namely, the representative rm). If job j does choose a machine of speed sm , then after choosing
the machine, DR checks if S = ∅ (which it is in this case), and begins a new phase by updating the
estimate Λ and resetting all virtual loads to 0 (in a manner consistent with FF ).
Hence, we need only consider the case when job j chooses the representative of a machine with
speed strictly less than sm . Suppose job j chooses some machine rtb , where 1 ≤ b ≤ |B |. Notice that,
if job j chooses rtb where b < |B | (so that |B | ≥ 2), then we have crtb j ≤ crtb+1 j , which by Lemma 2.6
implies that tb ∈ T . On the other hand, if job j chooses rtb where b = |B |, then assuming st |B | , sm
(as otherwise we are done, since this would contradict the fact that j chooses a machine with speed
strictly less than sm), we again have crt |B | j ≤ crm j , which implies t |B | ∈ T (by Lemma 2.6). Hence,
in all cases job j chooses the representative ri of some machine i , where i ∈ T (assuming it is not
assigned to a machine of speed sm ). □
Proof of Lemma 2.9:
Proof. We consider the case when both sets T and S are nonempty. In this case, FF is free to
assign job j to any machine ri where i ∈ T and si ≤ sk . We argue that DR sets prices so that j
chooses a machine in the same manner. Since S , ∅, there exists a machine i ∈ S where i satisfies
ℓˆi (j − 1) + pjsi ≤ 2 · Λ, which implies pj ≤ si (2 · Λ − ℓˆi (j − 1)) = µiq for some 1 ≤ q ≤ m. Notice that
µiq ≤ µim , and hence we have pj ≤ µim . Moreover, we always have the property µt |B | = µim , since
otherwise set A would be nonempty and hence DR would add more elements to set B. Therefore,
we know pj ≤ µt |B | . Thus, let 1 ≤ b ≤ |B | be the smallest value satisfying pj ≤ µtb (notice that such
a value b must exist as pj ≤ µt |B | ).
We now argue that sk = stb and assume towards a contradiction that sk < stb (clearly, sk ≤ stb ,
since machine tb is in S). Ifb = 1, we are done since st1 is the speed of the slowest machine, and hence
st1 ≤ sk (which implies st1 = sk ). Suppose b > 1, in which case we have µt1 ≤ · · · ≤ µtb−1 < pj . If a
machine of speed sk was in set Awhen DR added machine tb to set B, then we have a contradiction
as a machine of speed sk would have been added to B instead of machine tb , since we assumed
sk < stb . Hence, assume that all machines of speed sk were already removed from set A when
DR added tb to B. This means that all machines of speed sk appear earlier in the sorted ordering
µi1 ≤ · · · ≤ µim than machine tb−1 (possibly including the same position). This is a contradiction,
since we know µtb−1 < pj , and hence all machines of speed sk do not belong to set S , in which case
every machine of minimum speed in S has speed strictly more than sk .
If st |B | , sm , then observe that job j strictly prefers rt |B | to rm , since pj ≤ µtb ≤ · · · ≤ µt |B | and
hence pj < st |B | ((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆt |B | ), implying crt |B | j < crm j (the proof of Lemma 2.6 shows this). Thus,
DR sets prices so that j chooses some machine rth where 1 ≤ h ≤ |B |, whether or not st |B | = sm
(since if st |B | = sm , then j always chooses some machine rth where 1 ≤ h ≤ |B |). Assuming b < |B |,
then since pj ≤ µtb ≤ µtb+1 ≤ · · · ≤ µt |B | we have tb , . . . , t |B | ∈ T , implying ctb j ≤ · · · ≤ ct |B | j . In
fact, since pj ≤ µtb < stb ((2 + ϵ)Λ − ℓˆtb ) we know job j strictly prefers tb to all other machines
tb+1, . . . , t |B | (by Lemma 2.6). Thus, job j chooses some machine rth where 1 ≤ h ≤ b. Notice that
all such machines have srth = sth ≤ stb = sk . If job j chooses rtb , then we are done since pj ≤ µtb ,
implying tb ∈ T . Otherwise, job j chooses some machine rth for 1 ≤ h < b, which implies that
crth j ≤ crth+1 j , and hence th ∈ T . Thus, DR behaves consistently with FF . □
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